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Abstract 
 
We argue in this paper that the widely held view that the high level of cost inefficiency in 
Chinese banks is indicative of management deficiency is questionable. Using a non-parametric 
bootstrapping method, we decompose cost-inefficiency into technical-inefficiency and 
allocative-inefficiency and argue that allocative inefficiency should be viewed as rational in 
the sense that they are the outcomes of political and administrative constraints. Published 
studies of Chinese banks tend to place cost-inefficiency in the region of 50%. Such estimates 
would suggest that the management of Chinese banks was grossly inefficient. Over-utilization 
of labour in Chinese banks meets the social goals of the semi-planned economy. This paper 
finds evidence of over-utilization of labour and suggests that allowing for rational allocative 
inefficiency, Chinese banks have converged on a low level of technical inefficiency indicating 
a high level of management efficiency 
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1. Introduction 
Bank efficiency has always been a popular subject of research in China, and  l rge 
number of studies have been published in Chinese scholarly journals (e.g., Xue and Yang, 
1998, Wei and Wang, 2000, Zhao, 2000, Zhao, Zhou and Jiang, 2001 and Qing and Ou, 2001 
with non-parametric methods, and Qian, 2003, Liu and Song, 2004, Sun, 2005 and Zhang, Gu 
and Di, 2005 with parametric methods), and there is also a growing literature available to the 
non-Chinese reader, the first of these is perhaps Chen et. al. (2005), but other studies include 
Matthews et al. (2007), Fu and Heffernen (2007; 2009), Yao et al. (2008), Lin and Zhang 
(2009), Berger et al. (2009), and Asmild and Matthews (2012). The consensus of findings 
among Chinese scholars is that the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) tend on average 
to exhibit the lowest levels of efficiency and the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) show 
a faster growth in performance and efficiency.           
Cost inefficiency relative to “best practice” is usually blamed on bad management and 
poor motivation. Following Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency gap is sometimes termed “X-
inefficiency”. In an oft cited study of bank efficiency Berger et al. (1993) argue that 20% of 
bank costs is due to X-inefficiency. Studies of bank efficiency in China have estimated historic 
cost inefficiency in the region of 50%. Such figures imply that either Chinese bank 
management is grossly inefficient or that the estimates of cost efficiency have failed to take 
into account policy objectives and/or policy constraints that enter the decision making process.  
More recently Asmild and Matthews (2012), use multi-directional efficiency analysis (MEA) 
to confirm the conventional finding that SOCBs are less efficient than JSCBs. But importantly 
they also find differences in the patterns of inefficiencies due to labour input. Specifically, they 
find JSCBs are more efficient in labour utilization than SOCBs but that this inefficiency 
difference declines over time.  
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Given the vast literature on Chines bank efficiency, a pertinent question is, what does this 
paper add to the existing research? Briefly, our contribution is threefold. First, we use a 
relatively underutilized modelling technology to measure bank efficiency in China. To our 
knowledge there have been no studies that have applied this technology to the national 
mainstream banks in China and previous estimates can be challenged on statistical grounds.
Second, we use the concept of rational inefficiency first espoused by Bogetoft and Hougaard 
(2003) to identify a major source of inefficiency and provide evidence of misallocation of 
factor inputs by backing out the vector of factor shadow input prices. Third, we examine the 
convergence properties of our estimates to identify if market pressure and learning drive banks 
to a common level of efficiency. We show in this paper that in contrast to previous findings, a 
more rigorous measure of efficiency than what has hitherto been used in the literature, places 
Chinese banking at a relatively high level of management efficiency.  
        This paper has three objectives. First, it aims to measure cost inefficiency of Chinese 
banks using the familiar non-parametric method of Data-Envelopment-Analysis (DEA) by 
bootstrapping methods to provide estimates that lend themselves to statistical inference. Here 
we differ from the vast number of studies that use conventional DEA to study Chinese bank 
efficiency. Simar and Wilson (1998; 2000) pioneered the usage of bootstrap in deriving the 
sampling characteristics (standard deviation and bias, etc.) of the nonparametric DEA 
estimators. The intuitive appeal of the bootstrap DEA has attracted a lot of followers (for recent 
reviews and applications, see Simar and Wilson, 2008; 2013; Zhang and Matthews, 2012; 
Wijesiri et al., 2015; Wanke and Barros, 2016; Hosseinzadeh et al., 2016; etc.).  
        Second, it decomposes the measure of cost inefficiency into its constituent parts of  
technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. While we are not the first to undertake such 
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a decomposition for Chinese banks (Chen et al., 2005)1, here we provide an interpretation for 
the existence of allocative inefficiency and evidence of its source. This paper argues that while 
the underutilization of factor inputs is consistent with the notion of X-inefficiency, the wrong 
factor-mix is indicative of long-standing employment constraints imposed on the banking 
system in the pre-reform period. Insofar as allocative inefficiency can be explained as the result 
of officially sanctioned constraints, the implied cost inefficiency cannot be viewed wholly as a 
management deficiency but rather as a rational outcome of constrained optimizing behavior. 
In this respect the term ‘rational’ is fully consistent with the classification of Bogetoft and 
Hougaard (2003) who argue that that inefficiency in some cases may be the outcome of a 
rational choice (see also Tsionas and Izzeldin, 2018). The decomposition of cost inefficiency 
into its constituent parts allows us to examine their evolution over the sample period, and the 
speed of decline of this respective inefficiency.     
        Third, the bootstrap estimates of inefficiency are used to test various hypotheses regarding 
the levels, trends and convergence in technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. 
Hypothesis testing using conventional DEA can be challenged because the efficiency score 
estimates may be biased due to the random errors in the input/output data with finite sample 
size (Simar and Wilson, 1998, 2000; Sunil Dharmapala, 2018). Bootstrapping produces 
estimates of the bias enabling a more rigorous inference. Specifically, we test three hypotheses.  
      Hampered by its history of over-employment, banks that are directly controlled by the state 
will have higher allocative efficiency than the JSCBs. The corresponding hypothesis is: 
        Hypothesis 1: SOCBs will exhibit higher allocative inefficiency than JSCBs. 
A Corollary of Hypothesis 1 is that the allocative inefficiency is mostly due to the over-
utilization of labour. However, as the profit motive replaces other (social and economic) 
 
1 It could be argued that Chen et al. (2005) do not fully comply with the und rlying assumption of homogeneity 
in DEA by mixing banks that operate at the national level with banks that operate within geographically limited 
urban areas.  
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imperatives the levels of technical and allocative inefficiency should decline over time. 
Regulatory and market pressure, and the long-term threat of foreign banks entry may have 
sparked improved management, resulting in improved technical efficiency and lower cost-
inefficiency as incumbent banks attempt to cut costs and consolidate their balance sheets. The 
corresponding hypothesis is: 
        Hypothesis 2: Both SOCBs and JSCBs will exhibit declining inefficiency over time.  
But given the history of the state-owned banking system in maintaining the socialist plan, the 
SOCBs will reduce inefficiency at a slower rate than the JSCBs. The corresponding hypothesis 
is: 
        Hypothesis 3: SOCBs will reduce both technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency 
at a slower rate than JSCBs. 
To test the veracity of results we distinguish between two types of models. In model 1, the 
outputs of the banks are what has been typically used in the literature. In model 2, and given 
the history of China’s non-performing loans (NPL) history, we treat NPLs as an undesirable 
output. This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section provides a brief 
description of the Chinese banking system as a contextual background. Section 3 reviews the 
literature and provides a motivation for the concept of rational cost inefficiency. Section 4 
outlines the bootstrap methodology and discusses the data. Section 5 tests the hypotheses and 
discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Chinese banking 
Several good descriptions of the Chinese banking system exist (e.g., Chen et al., 2005, 
and Garcia-Herreo et al., 2006) and what follows is a recap and an update of the elements 
relevant to the issue of efficiency. Up until the mid-1990s, the principal function of the Chinese 
banking sector was to direct domestic savings to support state-owned-enterprises. Control of 
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the banking system remained firmly under the government and its agencies2. Under state 
control, the banks in China mainly served the plan of directing credit to specific projects 
dictated by political preference rather than commercial imperative. The reform process 
signaled by the Banking Law of 1995, saw the gradual evolution of the banking system towards 
full commercialization. This gradual process has involved recapitalization, foreign strategic 
investment, and improved governance, modern methods of risk management and limited 
liberalization of loan rate setting.  
Some of the big changes were the divestment of NPLs of the SOCBs in the period 1999-
2003 by the asset management companies set up for that purpose. The process of NPL 
divestiture continued during 2003-2005 (Li, 2013). Up until 2004 lending rates were strictly 
controlled within a narrow range by the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC). The legacy of the 
policy of strict control of lending rates along with policy directed lending was the underpricing 
of risk and the well-known history of China’s non-performing loans (NPLs). After 2004 the 
upper limit on interest rates were lifted and banks had the capability to risk price marginal 
lending. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial institutions were allowed to take a stake in 
selected Chinese banks. While control of individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the 
foreign institution3, the pressure to reform management, consolidate balance sheets, improve 
risk management and reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. 
According to China Bank Regulatory Commission’s Annual Report of Year 2017, the 
Chinese commercial banking market is made up of five large SOCBs and a dozen JSCBs. In 
2016, together they account for 78% of the commercial banking market and operate on a 
nationwide scale.  The remaining 22% of the market is made up of 134 city commercial banks 
 
2 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control 
of the government in 1995. 
3 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single investor, except 
in the case of joint-venture banks. 
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that normally operate within geographic boundaries, smaller rural cooperatives and other 
entities, and 68 foreign bank branches (constituting less than 1.5% of the market). 
Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the banking 
sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below shows that the 
ratio of total bank assets to GDP has doubled in the two decades in 1997 to 2016. The market 
remains dominated by the state-owned banks, although their share of the market has decreased 
steadily through competition from the other nationwide banks (and some City Commercial 
Banks).  
Table 1: The Chinese banking Market 
Variable 1997 2007 2016 
Total Assets to 
GDP 
125.6% 213.4% 253.2% 
Market share 
SOCB % assets 
88.0 53.2 54.9* 
NPL ratio  52.0% 8.1% 1.9% 
ROA 0.2% 0.9% 1.0% 
NIM  2.4% 2.7 % 2.6% 
Cost-Income Ratio  52.7% 42.8% 27.8% 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Individual Bank Annual Accounts, China Regulatory Banking 
Corporation Annual Report (various issues), Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, Fitch-Bankscope data 
base, National Bureau of Statistics of China, *Includes Bank of Communications which was included as a SOCB 
in 2007. 
 
        
Return on assets (ROA) was low in the early part of the sample largely due to the poor 
asset quality left on the balance sheets and a high level of non-performing loans (NPL). The 
PBOC created four asset management companies in 1999 to manage the NPLs of the SOCBs. 
As a result of the activities of the asset management companies in the period 1999-2002, the 
NPL ratio fell from over 50% in 1997 to under 2% in 2016. Net-interest margins (NIM) are 
respectable by Western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent with 
economies in a similar stage of development (as for example India where NIM would be in the 
region of 3%). Part of the problem as stated earlier, was that interest rates were heavily 
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controlled during much of this period. The non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of the commercial 
banks has fallen from 52% in 1997 to under 2% in 2016.  
It is arguable that a mixture of regulatory and market pressure to reform provided the 
background for the major banks to begin the process of restructuring and reducing unit costs. 
Recapitalization by the state, reformed corporate governance, strategic foreign investment, 
improved profitability and efficiency of the SOCBs was a prelude to international listing4 (Lin 
et al., 2015). Other markers that acted as gateposts of the reform process were accession to 
WTO in 2001 and the roll-out of the conditions to banking in 2006, the setting up of the China 
Bank Regulatory Commission in 2003, limited loan rate reform 2004 and 2013, and limited 
deposit rate reform in 2014.  
  
3. Literature review and the concept of rational allocative inefficiency  
 A number of efficiency studies of Chinese banks have emerged in recent years, using 
both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis. Other studies by Chinese scholars that have used 
non-parametric and parametric techniques include Fang et al. (2004), Liu and Liu (2004), Sun 
(2005), Qian (2003), Chi, Sun and Lu (2005), Yao, Feng and Jiang (2004). The consensus of 
finding from the DEA studies is threefold. First, because of the continued banking reform 
programme technical inefficiency has been declining over time. Second, average bank 
efficiency is lower in the state-owned banks (SOCBs) than in the joint stock banks (JSCBs). 
Third, the gap between the two has been narrowing in recent years.  
        Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and X-efficiency 
interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept they are not 
 
4 Bank of Communications was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 2005, and on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in May 2007; China Construction Bank was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in Oct 2005, and 
on Shanghai Stock Exchange in Sep 2007; Bank of China was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in June 
2006, and on Shanghai Stock Exchange in July2006; ICBC was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges Oct, 2006; Agricultural Bank of China was listed on Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in 
July, 2010. 
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necessarily the same. The concept of technical efficiency derives its basis in the neo-classical 
theory of the firm and assumes profit maximising behaviour. A firm or a bank may be 
technically inefficient for technical reasons such as low training or low human capital levels of 
managers and workers, or the use of inferior or out-of-date technology. The diffusion of new 
technology is not instantaneous, and some firms or banks may lag behind others in the 
acquisition and utilisation of new technology. With further training and updating of capital, the 
firm or bank can expect to move towards the efficient frontier. X-inefficiency is not caused by 
the variability of skills or the time variability of technology diffusion but by the use and 
organisation of such skills and technology. 
        Whereas X-inefficiency is viewed by Leibenstein (1966) as the outcome of non-
maximising behaviour, Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that the existence of X-
inefficiency in production is the result of a rational decision-making process that represents on-
the-job compensation to managers or optimisation subject to extra constraints. To quote: 
“……we see inefficiency and in particular the allocation of inefficiency (slack) 
among different inputs as the result of a rational choice made by that firm.”….”The bureaucrat 
may well use a cost-minimizing mix of input but the level of resource us is socially inefficient” 
Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003), pp. 244-245. 
 
In other words, allocative inefficiency may be rational.  
        Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) have argued that X-inefficiency constitutes 20% or 
more of bank costs. X-inefficiency arises as a result of low pressure for performance. Some 
institutions would be protected by government regulation that would reduce the external 
pressure of competition. But even with a higher degree of pressure from the environment, firms 
may have organisational deficiencies so that management signals and incentives are lost in the 
hierarchy of the organisation.   
In the earlier period the banks in China operated under stringent state control. After 1995 
the state relaxed its grip, but an important but relatively unknown feature of the pre-reform 
banking system was that the banks were compelled to employ all banking graduates of the 
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universities set up by the People’s Bank of China. Similarly, the banks were compelled to 
employ party officials and retirees of the People’s Liberation Army who had completed their 
tour of duty. The overhang of Party officials and former PLA officers employed in the banks 
during the pre-reform period contributes to the overall picture of overstaffing5. One example 
is the following quote from an anonymous risk manager: 
“Many heads of sub-branches are not professional bankers but are retired army officers 
of 10-15 years’ experience. They tend to be appointed at high levels even as President 
or Head of HRM and even on the credit committee” Risk Manager - China 
Construction Bank (Dalian 2007)6 
 
        Other forms of inefficiency arise from government imperatives for the state-owned banks 
to locate branches in unprofitable areas. Former studies suggest exceptionally high levels of 
cost inefficiency in Chinese banks7. However, since listing of the SOCBs the compulsion to 
employ retired personnel from the PLA has been relaxed. 
“Historically this was the case but since listing it is no longer true. Social objectives 
were important in the past but now the profit objective is most important. But even now 
the profit objective is not the only one. Loss making branches are maintained if there is 
a social need”. HRM Manager Industrial and Commercial Bank of China -
Shenzhen 20098. 
 
Figure 1 shows an isoquant qq producing a given output with factor inputs D and L and 
isocost ww, which traces the ratio of factor prices. The efficient cost minimising position is 
shown at e where ww is tangential to qq. However, employing a factor combination shown by 
 
5 This practice has received a recent boost with the announcement that state-owned enterprises will have to absorb 
an extra 300,000 laid-off members of the PLA, undermining the pressure on state-owned companies to become 
more efficient. Financial Times, December 29 2015, China orders SOEs to hire former soldiers.  
6 One of a number of interviews with managers in Chinese banks conducted as part of a British Academy funded 
project. See Matthews (2013). 
7 Fu and Heffernen (2007) find average inefficiency levels of 50%-60% for 1993-2002; Chen et al. (2005) estimate 
it as 44%-66% in 1993-2000, and Matthews et al. (2007) estimate it at 50%-60% in 1997-2004. 
8 While this practice has been relaxed evidence is that it still continues. A recent announcement that state-owned 
enterprises will have to absorb an extra 300,000 laid-off members of the PLA, undermines the pressure on state-
owned companies including banks to become more efficient. Fi ancial Times, December 29 2015, China orders 
SOEs to hire former soldiers.  
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point c, which is to the right of the isoquant qq indicates that the firm is technically inefficient. 
Efficiency is decomposed into technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE).  
        Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio Oa/Oc (Technical inefficiency is given by 
ac/Oc). The cost to the firm is shown by w''w'' which is parallel to ww and passes through point 
c. Cost efficiency (CE) is measured by Ob/Oc and Ob/Oa gives AE9. 
 
 
Figure 1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        To understand the perceived high level of cost inefficiency in Chinese banks we use an 
illustrative model of allocative inefficiency based on staffing targets provided by the central 
authorities. Assume that the bank produces a single earnings asset (A). In reality this will 
consist of a combination of commercial loans, mortgages, government bonds, short-term bills, 
 
9 It can be seen from this decomposition that under the assumption of constant returns to scale that AE = CE/TE. 
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etc. We assume that this earning asset is produced by the inputs deposits (D), labour (L) and 
fixed capital assets )(K 10: 
= � , , ̅ = −° ̅ − −                                      (1) 
The prices of inputs are, the cost of deposits (r), the cost of labour (w) and the cost of fixed 
assets (ρ). The bank can hire two types of labour {L1 and L2}. The first type (L1) are bank 
workers who have a higher marginal product than the second type (L2) who are bureaucrats. 
However, the bank is constrained to pay the same wage to both types of workers. The objective 
of the bank manager is to minimise costs subject to an output target:  
Min ( )( )AKLLDrDwLwLK −−+++ −−− )1()1(2121  .                         (2) 
The bank is constrained to employ some type 2 labour but clearly in an unconstrained world 
the bank would only employ type 1 workers. From the FOC of (1) the ratio of the marginal 
products of the two types of labour is given by
( )( ) 1)1( 21 =− LA
LA


. Since this contradicts the 
assumption of type 1 labour having a higher marginal product than type 2 labour it follows that 
γ = 1 and L2 = 0. The solution for output in the unconstrained case is given by: 
( )
)1(
1
1
1 






 −−+−−− 

 −

= KLrwA .     (3) 
In the constrained case, the bank has to employ a certain number of type 2 labour given by the 
central government so that 22 LL = . The objective function is now: 
        Min ( )( ) ( )222)1()1(21121 LLAKLLDrDwLwLK −−−−+++ −−−   .  (4) 
The first order conditions are: 
 
10 This uses the assumption of the intermediation approach that recognises that the outputs are the interest earning 
assets while deposits and borrowed funds are included with capital labour as inputs (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). 
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The marginal wage premium for type 2 labour is given by λ2. 
The output function is now: 
  )1()1(21

 
 −−−+−−

= KLLrwA .     (5) 
Denoting the input of type 1 labour in the unrestricted case as UL1 and the same for the restricted 
case as RL1 , from (5) and (3) we have the relationship described by: 
  
( )



 )1(
211
1
1 −++
−
=

 −
LLL RU .      (6) 
The allocative inefficiency generated by the additional constraint in the restricted case is 
described by: 
  
U
R
L
LL
1
21 + .         (7) 
Expression (7) must be strictly greater than unity for an allocative inefficiency to exist. Because 
the marginal productivity of the type 2 labour is less than type 1 labour, the type 1 labour 
displaced by the constraint of having to employ a fixed amount of type 2 labour is less than 
one-for-one if the target level of output (earnings assets) is to be maintained.  
        In reality, banks are multi-output enterprises and one of the conventional ways of 
modelling the efficiency of banks is the non-parametric method of Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as the ratio of projected output (on the efficient frontier) 
to actual input used. There are a number of papers that describe the methodology of DEA as 
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applied to banking, and therefore will not be elaborated here (Drake, 2004; Fethi and 
Passourias, 2010).  
        DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practices amongst the decision-
making units (DMUs).11 An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in relation to this 
frontier. DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or output orientation) and 
functional form; however, the results are sensitive to the choice of inputs and outputs. The 
weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes data are free from measurement errors. 
Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a relative way, its analysis is confined to the 
sample used. This means that an efficient DMU found in the analysis cannot be compared in a 
straightforward way with other DMUs outside of the sample.  
 
 
      4. Bootstrap methodology and data 
        As pointed out by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2011), the scores produced by DEA 
methods are not deterministic but the estimates of underlying true scores. It is therefore natural 
to consider the sensitivity of the estimators to sampling variation. Due to the complex nature 
of the modelling framework and the computation of the DEA estimators, there are in general 
no readily available analytical results for the sampling distributions of the DEA estimators 
(Kneip et.al. 2008; Simar and Wilson, 2008). However, without the capability for statistical 
inference, the non-parametric DEA method is viewed as a weak alternative to parametric 
methods of estimating efficiency. Meanwhile, the conventional DEA efficiency scores 
estimators are biased by construction, and though in certain cases they are consistent in theory, 
their convergence rates suffer from the “curse of dimensionality” (i.e., low number of DMUs 
 
11 Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is another popular way of modelling technological frontier and relative 
efficiency/productivity. For a recent study and review of SFA, see Tsionas and Mallick (2019).   
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relative to number of input and output variables) and their accuracy relies on the relative sample 
size. In light of the above concerns, a number of researchers (Simar and Wilson 1998, 2000a, 
2000b, 2007, 2009; Thanassoulis et al., 2008; Kneip et al., 2011) recommend the bootstrap 
method to obtain the sampling distribution of the DEA estimators and to reduce their potential 
biases by bootstrap correction. 
        The bootstrap procedures for DEA models are set out in Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 
2000b, 2007). We assume that the observed inputs-outputs pairs data sample � ={ ),( ii yx  i = 
1,…,n } are generated by a Data Generating Process (DGP) �, which satisfies a number of 
regularity conditions. Let x, y  be a fixed point, which may not necessarily be one of the points 
in �, and ̂ ,  be the estimated DEA efficiency score of the true unknown efficiency score θ x, y . As we mentioned above, the sampling distribution of ̂ , − θ x, y |� is hard to 
derive. Let �̂ be a consistent estimator of � from the observed data �. Now suppose we draw 
a random sample of data �∗ = { �∗, �∗ , � = , … , �} from �̂. The new data can be then used 
to compute an efficiency score ̂∗ , . According to the bootstrap theory, we have that;  
           ̂ ∗ , −  ̂ x, y |�̂  approx~ ̂ , − θ x, y |�. 
Therefore we can use the distribution of ̂∗ , −  ̂ x, y  to approximate the distribution and 
calculate the small sample bias of ̂ , − θ x, y , the former can be obtained by resampling 
from the distribution �̂.     
        There are three popular bootstrap methods to obtain �̂, the estimator of �: the naive 
bootstrap, the homogeneous bootstrap and the heterogeneous bootstrap. The naive bootstrap 
use the empirical distribution to estimate �. However, since � has bounded support and that 
the efficiency scores are bounded by definition, the naive bootstrap gives inconsistent estimates 
(Simar and Wilson, 2000b, 2011). Both the homogeneous bootstrap and the heterogeneous 
bootstrap were devised to deal with the inconsistency of the naive bootstrap. The major steps 
16 
 
of the homogeneous and the heterogeneous bootstrap are as follows (see Simar and Wilson 
1998; 2000a for detailed implementation algorithms): 
 First, the density function � ,  of { ),( ii yx  i = 1,…,n } is translated into its polar 
coordinates version� , , , where   denotes efficiency and denotes angle (of) 
respectively. The homogeneous bootstrap assumes that� | , = � , while the 
heterogeneous bootstrap does not maintain this restriction. As acknowledged by Simar and 
Wilson (2011), the generality of heterogeneous bootstrap comes at the price of increased 
complexity and computational burden.  
 Second, B pseudo-samples { �∗ , �∗ , �∗ : � = , … , �;  = , … , }  are drawn from a 
smooth, consistent and nonparametric estimate of� , , .  
 Third, the B pseudo-samples { �∗ , �∗ , �∗ : � = , … , �;  = , … , } are translated into 
the corresponding pseudo-samples{ �∗ , �∗ : � = , … , �;  = , … , }.  
         After the B sets of bootstrap samples { �∗ , �∗ : � = , … , �;  = , … , } are obtained, 
we can use each of the data sample to compute the efficiency scores ̂∗ , , = , … , �. The 
bias-corrected estimate of θ x, y  is defined as 
         ̂̂ x, y = ̂ x, y − �̂ = ̂ x, y − [� ∑ ̂∗ ,�= − ̂ x, y ]                            = ̂ x, y − � ∑ ̂∗ ,�= . 
        In this paper we show the results from the homogeneous bootstrap approach to obtain �̂, 
but we also use the heterogeneous approach as a robustness check. The results are qualitatively 
similar but less precise. This is not surprising since the finite sample performance of the 
bootstrap procedures depend on a number of factors such as the sample size, the return to scale 
assumption, and the curvature of the frontier. Simar and Wilson (2011) find that the 
homogeneous bootstrap generally has stable and satisfactory performance using a number of 
numerical simulations.  The results from the heterogeneous bootstrap is shown in the appendix. 
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We follow the Simar-Wilson (2000b) method to obtain 1000 bootstrap values of the individual 
DMU for the efficiency scores in each year.  Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have 
been conducted by Casu and Molyneux (2003); and in the case of Chinese rural credit 
cooperatives, Dong and Featherstone (2006). 
This study employs annual data (1997-2016) for 14 banks: the five SOCBs, and nine 
JSCBs. The choice of sample is based on the argument that the banks chosen are national based 
and not restricted to city or regional operation. The total sample consisted of 280 bank year 
observations. The main source of the data is Fitch/Bankscope, and individual annual reports of 
banks. The full data set is available on request. 
        The most common approach for the choice of inputs and outputs is to treat bank assets as 
outputs and liabilities as inputs (see Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010).  An increasing number of 
studies take a hybrid approach that uses the conventional three inputs of employees (LAB), 
fixed assets (FA) and total deposits (DEP) but include non-interest income (NII) as an 
additional output to loans, other earning assets (OEA). In this study we use the conventional 
set of inputs but use two sets of outputs. Specifically, we consider two models. In Model 1 the 
outputs consist of total performing loans, other earning assets, and non-performing loans as a 
‘bad’ output. Following Thanassoulis et al., 2008, the inverse of NPL was included as an output 
as a means of measuring bad output. In Model 2 the outputs consist of performing loans 
(PLOAN) plus other earning assets (OEA) to give total earning assets, non-performing loans 
(NPL) as a bad output, and non-interest earnings as an additional output. Fethi and Pasiouras 
(2010) list six recent studies that have used NII with stock variables as an output in DEA studies 
of banks. Non-interest income is a growing area of business for Chinese banks rising from 
around 2% of earnings in 1997 to 17% in 2012. As Chinese banks have had a troubled history 
of non-performing loans, it is appropriate to include NPLS as a bad output produced alongside 
good outputs of performing loans and other earning assets. 
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        The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the factor prices of 
the relevant inputs above. We distinguish between the price of labour (PL), price of fixed 
capital (PK) and the price of funds (PF). Conventionally, the price of labour is obtained as the 
ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees. The price of fixed capital is obtained 
as operating expenses less personnel expenses divided by fixed assets (less depreciation). The 
price of funds is obtained from the ratio of interest paid to total funds. 
        Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 1997 and 2016 as 
a snapshot indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high standard deviation is an 
indication of the dominance of the 5 state owned banks. The table shows how fast earnings 
assets have grown over this period. The total stock of performing loans has grown at an average 
of 19 per cent a year. Other earning assets have also grown at an average rate of 19% a year, 
in part reflecting the activities of the asset management companies that swapped a proportion 
of the NPLs of the big 4 state-owned banks for bonds in 1999, 2001 and 2004. The most 
remarkable growth is in non-interest earnings which have grown at an average rate of 28% a 
year, reflecting an increasing source of profit for banks that have traditionally depended on the 
banking book for the generation of income. 
Table 2: Output-Input Variables 1997 - 2016  
Variable 
 
Description Mean 1997 SD 1997 Mean 2016 SD 2016 
PLOANS 
RMB mill 
Total stock of 
performing 
loans 
217558 320219 4687964 4107095 
NPL 
RMB mill 
Non-
performing 
loans. 
212500 353886 81769 73518 
OEA 
RMB mill 
Investments 
 
205103 301626 3123224 2015631 
NII 
RMB mill 
Non-interest 
income 
862 1922 57234 37929 
LAB Total Employed 105138 175233 155184 171382 
DEP 
RMB mill 
Total stock of 
Deposits 
604013 891353 7902297 6452333 
FA 
RMB mill 
Fixed assets 
 
12831 19398 68385 68183 
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PL Unit price of 
labour 
.0631 .0380 .3359 .0791 
PF Unit price of 
funds 
.0502 .0202 .0202 .0039 
PK Unit price of 
fixed assets 
.6528 .5282 .8408 .4283 
 Sources: Bankscope and author calculations. 
 
        Other points to note are that employment has grown by an average of 2% a year but 
average labour cost has grown by a remarkable 11% a year, reflecting the increasing skill 
premium paid to workers in this sector. A further point to note is reduced relative dispersion of 
the variables (coefficient of variation) which also indicates an increased convergence of the 
nationwide banks on each other.  
        Before moving to the empirical results and their implications, let’s make some comments 
on the data quality issue. The specific question is whether information contained in our limited 
data sample is sufficient enough to reliably identify the difference in efficiencies across 
individual DMUs. We stated above that DEA with small sample size may suffer the “curse of 
dimensionality”. We want to emphasize that such an issue is actually immaterial if not 
completely irrelevant here for the following observations. First, a number of existing studies 
suggest that for general cases the efficiency estimates of DEA are reliable if the relative 
information ratio � +⁄ , where �, ,  are the number of DMUs, the number of 
inputs, and the number of outputs, respectively, and  is some threshold. Golany and Roll 
(1989) propose that = , while Banker et al. (1989), Friedman and Sinuany-Stern (1998) and 
Cooper et al. (2007) propose that = . In our case the ratio of � +⁄  is 2.3 for Model 1 
and 2 for Model 2, which is close to the proposed theoretical threshold. Second, a number of 
studies (Wang, 2009; Xu and Chen, 2012; Liu, Miao and Zhu, 2012) have demonstrated that 
the national wide banks in China, as those used in our sample, have very similar operations 
structure, hence there is strong homogeneity among their input/output characteristics. The 
similarity of the SOCBs are even more prominent, as there are frequency alternations of senior 
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officials among them. The homogeneity of the DMUs’ characteristics largely obviates the 
sample size requirement for the validity of DEA estimates, in that the reliability of DEA 
estimators, as of any other statistical estimators, is inversely related to the variation across 
individual units. Third, to minimize the potential bias of the DEA estimators caused by limited 
sample size, this paper uses the bootstrap corrected efficiencies instead of the original DEA 
estimates. Chernick (2007, pps. 173-174) pointed out that though bootstrap is theoretically 
justified asymptotically, it can work well with small sample. 12 Chernick suggested that in 
general applications sample size should be greater than 10 for bootstrap to deliver reliable 
estimates.  This condition is satisfied in all our bootstrap calculations. Meanwhile, the strong 
homogeneity of the population of China’s national wide banks again further substantiates the 
validity of bootstrap with small sample size, as when the population characteristics is of low 
variation, a small number of observations might be representative of the population and 
sufficient to approximate the true unknown population distribution. To summarize, the 
accuracy of the DEA estimators and their bootstrap bias corrections depend both on the 
effective sample size and the degree of variation across individual units. The strong 
homogeneity among China’s national wide banks relaxes the demand for large sample size in 
both DEA and bootstrap analyses.  
 
5. Empirical results 
        Table 3 provides the summary statistics of technical and allocative inefficiency for the 
two models for the full sample, and sub-samples. Cost inefficiency (CI) and technical 
inefficiency (TI) estimates were obtained as CI = (1 – CE) and TI = (1 – TE) respectively. The 
allocative inefficiency estimate was obtained as the residual of the cost inefficiency CI and TI 
 
12 To quote Chernick (2007), pp. 173: “Although we have good reasons not to trust the bootstrap in very small 
samples and theoretical justification is asymptotic, the results were surprisingly good even for sample size as 
small as 14 in the two-class problem.” 
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(AI = CI – TI)13. Given the higher propensity for overstaffing and wider branch network in the 
SOCB banks, a higher level of allocative inefficiency would be expected for those banks. Table 
3 shows that the mean allocative inefficiency for the JSCB banks is consistently and 
significantly lower than that of the SOCB. In keeping with the mainstream finding of Chinese 
scholars, there is also evidence that the JSCBs have on average, a lower level of technical 
inefficiency than the SOCBs. 
                                             Table 3: Mean inefficiency 1997 – 2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Statistic TI AI  TI AI  
Mean .089 .162 .117 .131 
Std Dev .094 .178 .130 .139 
Mean SOCB .119 .263 .145 .205 
Mean JSCB .078 .121 .105 .101 
Z test -0.35 -7.42*** -0.65 -5.54*** 
     
*** significant at the 1%,  
        The results of the non-parametric tests indicate a significant difference between the 
average level of allocative inefficiency between the SOCBs and JSCBs but also significant 
differences between the two bank types for technical inefficiency. Therefore Hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed. Average allocative inefficiency is higher in SOCBs than JSCBs in both models.  
        However, allocative inefficiency does not necessarily imply that the misallocation is due 
to excess utilization of labour. We provide evidence for our case by extracting the shadow price 
of labour from the technically efficient but not cost-efficient banks. The vector of shadow prices 
 
13 Strictly AE = CE/TE but as we are dealing with the mean values of an unknown distribution it was convenient 
to define AI = CI-TI = TE-CE. The alternative measure is AI*= (1-AE)=(TE-CE)/TE. 
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consonant with an allocative inefficiency is shown in Figure 2. At point “a” on the isoquoant, 
the bank is technically efficient but allocatively inefficient.  However, it is allocatively efficient 
relative to the shadow input price ratio. The ratio of shadow prices is given by the dashed line 
“ss” and is tangent to the isoquant qq at point “a” (see Kumbhakar and Knox-Lovell (2003), 
pps. 221-222).  At this point  
� ��⁄� ��⁄ | = �� | < �� |  which says that the bank is allocatively 
inefficient with respect to the benchmark ratio of input prices but allocatively efficient with 
respect to the shadow prices. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Shadow Price Vector  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        To test whether the allocative efficiency is induced by the over-utilisation of labour, each 
year we set up a benchmark bank that is cost efficient and use the virtual input weights of 
factors inputs as the efficient factor allocation. For each year we pick out those banks that are 
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technically efficient but allocatively inefficient (not cost efficient) and compare their factor 
input weights with the benchmark. Lower factor input weights in labour imply that the bank is 
under-pricing labour (shadow price is lower than actual) and over-utilizing labour. We can 
isolate all technically efficient but allocatively inefficient banks that have the wrong factor mix, 
for all years. We can then test if the distribution of labour-over-utilized and labour-under-
utilized banks is random or systematic. 
        Let N be the number of technically efficient but allocatively inefficient banks across all 
years, and X be the number of labour-over-utilized banks among those N banks. Define =�/�, and p0 be the theoretical proportion in the population. We test � : .5 �  � : >.5. The test statistic for this problem is = �− .5√� −� /�. The p value for this test is Pr � , >
. Table 4 presents our results. 
Table 4: Over-utilization of labour 1997-2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 
No.: TE banks 121 129 
No.: TE but not CE banks 55 57 
No.: TE over-utilizing labour 35 38 
t-statistic 18.4*** 2.7** 
*** significant at the 1%,; ** significant at the 5%  
 
 
        The results show that the distribution of technically efficient but cost inefficient banks is 
not random, and the hypothesis that more banks over-utilize labour than under-utilize labour is 
supported by empirical data. The Corollary of Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. 
        The next important question is, is inefficiency in Chinese banks as a whole declining and 
if so, what can be said about the speed at which the inefficient banks are converging on the 
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benchmark efficient banks? Using the concept of beta-convergence from the growth 
convergence literature (Barro, 1991), we can obtain a measure of the speed of convergence to 
a common level of inefficiency by regressing the change in the level of inefficiency on the lag 
of inefficiency (see also Fung, 2006). The absolute value of the negative coefficient on the 
lagged inefficiency indicates the speed of convergence. An interactive term between a zero-
one dummy variable identifying the SOCBs and the lagged inefficiency variable is used to 
identify differences in the speed of decline in inefficiency between the SOCBs and the JSCBs.  
        As section 2 describes, Chinese banks have been in a perpetual state of reform since 1996 
and subject to continuous regulatory changes. All these continuous innovations and reforms 
may have affected average cost efficiency and are difficult to model. Hence, we use time 
dummy variables to account for the many reforms and changes to Chinese banks over time. 
Each year is identified as ‘1’ for the year and ‘0’ for all other years. The definition of the two 
dependent variables lend itself to estimation by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) as 
CI=TI+AI. We didn’t use the two-step DEA procedure of Simar and Wilson (2007) in the light 
of the following two concerns. First, our dependent variables is the change in the efficiency 
scores, not the efficiency scores per se; therefore, we don’t face the bounded dependent 
variable issue as in the two-step DEA. Second, our original efficiency scores were calculated 
year by year, which indicates that the issue of the serial correlation of efficiency scores is also 
not very serious. Table 5 presents our results. 
Table 5: SURE Estimates. Dependant Variable is the year-on-year change in inefficiency, 
‘p’ values in parenthesis 1998-2016 
 Change in technical-inefficiency = 
ΔTIt 
Change in allocative-inefficiency 
= ΔAIt 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept .015 
(.302) 
.075*** 
(.000) 
.021 
(.98) 
-.076 
(.217) 
TI t-1 -.599*** 
(.000) 
-.532*** 
(.004) 
- - 
AI t-1 - - -.418*** 
(.000) 
-.489*** 
(.000) 
SOCB* TIt-1 .172*** .042*** - - 
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(.006) (.005) 
SOCB* AIt-1 - - .122*** 
(.003) 
.156*** 
(.007) 
Time 
dummies 
 
R2 
 
Yes 
 
 
.7555 
Yes 
 
 
.7384 
Yes 
 
 
.8863 
Yes 
 
 
.6834 
Chi Square χ2(20)=823*** χ2(20)=2083*** χ2(20)=745** χ2(20)=568*** 
 
Obs 266 266 266 266 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%. 
 
 
A consistent result is the negative coefficient on the lagged measure of inefficiency which 
indicates a decline in both types of inefficiency over time. The estimated coefficients suggest 
that the JSCBs are reducing both technical (X-) inefficiency and allocative efficiency at roughly 
the same rate in both models. Hence, the results confirm Hypothesis 2 and support the findings 
of Asmild and Matthews (2012). Importantly the interaction term of lagged inefficiency with 
the SOCB dummy variable suggests that the state-owned banks reduce both types of 
inefficiency at a slower speed than the JSCBs. Hence Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.  
 
6.  Conclusion   
        This paper has used non-parametric methods to conduct an analysis of cost inefficiency 
in a sample of Chinese banks. Two models were considered. Both had a common set of inputs 
but outputs in the first model were performing loans, other earning assets and NPLs as a bad 
output, and in the second model were total earnings assets, non-performing loans, as a bad 
output, and non-interest earnings. The estimates of bank inefficiency were obtained using a 
homogeneous bootstrapping method to enable statistical inference and finite sample bias 
correction. Cost inefficiency was partitioned into technical (X-) inefficiency and allocative 
inefficiency. We find evidence to suggest that the allocative inefficiency is dominated by 
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excess labour. This confirms the findings of Asmild and Matthews (2012), but our findings 
also show that Chinese banks have been improving performance by reducing both types of 
inefficiency. However, the state-owned banking sector has been reducing both types of 
inefficiency at a slower rate than joint-stock commercial banks. This suggests that state-owned 
banks are more constrained by social and political objectives in their downsizing strategy than 
JSCBs. 
        In contrast to the earlier findings we find that average cost inefficiency in Chinese banks 
are in the region of 27-28% for the full sample period, and declining. We have argued in this 
paper that given the social and political constraints that Chinese banks have had to operate 
under, allocative inefficiency is symptomatic of rational decision making dictated by social 
employment objectives and not management deficiency. However, the results must be 
interpreted with caution. Not all allocative inefficiency can be attributed to over-staffing. It is 
also possible that the same poor management decisions that have contributed to technical 
inefficiency may also have contributed to allocative inefficiency.   
        Yet, the argument of this paper is that there have been significant improvements in bank 
efficiency in this period and that allocative inefficiency should be interpreted as largely rational 
and not an indicator of poor management. The 2016 average of all banks technical inefficiency 
and allocative inefficiency is 3% and 12% respectively in model 1, and 2% and 6% in model 
2. If allocative inefficiency can be interpreted as mostly rational, then management inefficiency 
in 2016 measured by average technical inefficiency lies in the neighbourhood of 2-3% 
representing a significant improvement in efficiency performance and convergence on best 
practice, which may not be dissimilar to their western counterparts. The reform process that 
began in 1995 appears to have produced   the appropriate results.
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